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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

EDDY N. BETENSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CALL AUTO & EQUIPMENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
et al. ,
Defendants-Respondent.

)
)

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

EUGENE L. LOWIN and
GENEVA LOWIN,

CASE NO. 17600

)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CALL AUTO & EQUIPMENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
et al.,
Defendants-Respondent.

)
)
)
)

)
)
)

)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
These Appeals are taken from two Orders entered by
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about
January 28, 1981, dismissing with prejudice the Complaints on
file in these actions as against Defendant-Respondent Fireman's
Fund Insurance Companies only.

These Appeals are also taken
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from two further Orders entered by the District Court denying
Appellants' motions to modify the Orders of Dismissal and
entering final Judgments in favor of Respondents insofar as
those Orders denied Appellants leave to amend.

The Complaints

in both actions, insofar as relevant herein, sought recovery
under a Motor Vehicle Dealer's Bond issued by Respondent in
favor of Defendant Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc.

The two

actions have been consolidated for all purposes, including Appea.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants request this Court to reverse the Judgment;
appealed from and remand this case to the District Court for
further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These actions, which have been consolidated for all
purposes 1 , were collllilenced to recover money loaned by Plaintiffs
to Defendant Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc. ("Call Auto")
in essentially identical transactions. 2
Appellants allege in their Complaints (B. R. 2 & 42;
L.R.2) that they were induced through fraud to pay money to
1

The transcript in the Betenson case will be cited as "B.R."
and the transcript in the Lowin case as "L.R.".

2 The allegations of both Complaints insofar as relevant to
these appeals and to the claims against Respondent are ot
for all intents and purposes the same. Res~ond~nt ~as n
named as a Defendant in the original Complaint in.t e 8
Betenson action. However, an Amendment to Complaint fw!ction
filed on or about October 15, 19~0, addi~g a ca~~ef~vor
against Respondent on its Dealer s Bond issued i
of Call Auto (B.R.42).
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Call Auto, which was engaged in the business as a motor vehicle
dealer, in consideration for Call Auto's promise to repay
Appellants' money together with a guaranteed profit in specified
installments.

Call Auto represented and agreed that all monies

paid by Appellants would be at all times fully secured by property and equipment owned by Call Auto.

Subsequently, Call Auto

fraudulently disposed of substantially all of the property and
equipment which Call Auto represented would serve as security
for Appellants' indebtedness without regard to Appellants'
security interest in that property and equipment and failed to
repay Appellants as agreed.
The Complaints seek recovery against Respondent under
a Dealer's Bond issued in favor of Call Auto in the amount of
$20,000.00 pursuant to the provisions of Section 41-3-16, Utah
Code Annotated (1953).

Pursuant to the terms of the bond,

Respondent agreed to pay any claims or judgments against Call
Auto for violation of the Motor Vehicle Act or fraud.
In each transaction entered into with Appellants,
Call Auto executed with Appellants a standard form agreement
which Call Auto had prepared. 3 The form agreements each recited
that Call Auto had approached each Appellant for the purpose of
entering into an investment in Call Auto's business "as a type
of joint venture", that Call Auto was going to use the funds
in buying and selling various types of personal property and
3 All the agreements between Appell~n~s and Call Au~o were
attached to the Complaints as exhibits (B.R.20-32, L.R.7) ·
A copy of the form agreement entered into between Cal~ Auto
and the Lowin Appellants is attached hereto as Appendix A
forSponsored
theby Court's
reference.
the S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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equipment at a profit "in its business" and that Call Auto
guaranteed to pay to each Appellant "as his or her share of the
profits and investments" certain specific amounts in installment
In some cases, Call Auto even executed promissory notes (B.R.28)
Respondent subsequently moved to dismiss both Complaint,
as against it on the basis that Call Auto and Appellants were,
as a matter of law, joint venturers with respect to Call Auto's
business, and, consequently, Appellants were not entitled to
the protection of the Dealer's Bond (B. R .100&134-142; L. R. 23).
On or about January 28, 1981, the Trial Court granted
the Motions to Dismiss with prejudice in both actions on the
basis that the "joint venture" language of the form agreements
conclusively established a joint venture between the parties
as a matter of law.

Therefore, the Court concluded Appellants

were not entitled to the protection of the Dealer's Bond
(B.R.144&156; L.R.28-29).
Appellants subsequently filed motions to reconsider
the Orders of Dismissal or to at least modify those Orders
to allow Appellants leave to amend the Complaints (B.R.169;
L. R. 30).

These motions were denied by the District Court in

February 1981, and, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, the District Court directed that final
judgment be entered in favor of Respondent in both actions
(B.R.174; L.R.36).
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT

APPELLANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER RESPONDENT'S
BOND.
The sole question before the District Court was whether,
accepting the allegations of the Complaints in these actions as
true, the Complaints nevertheless failed to state a claim
against Respondent upon which relief could be granted.

One

author has stated the standard by which a Motion to Dismiss
should be considered as follows:
"For the purposes of the motion, the wellpleaded facts are taken as admitted . . . .
A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it alpears to a certainty
that laintiff is entit ed to no relief under
state o

ort

See also, Motivated Management Intern. v. Finney, 604 P.2d 469
(Ut. 1979); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207 (Ut. 1965); King
Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 374 P.2d 254 (Ut. 1962).
Even if a Complaint fails to state a claim it is an
abuse of discretion for a Court to deny leave to amend, "if
it appears at all possible that the Plaintiff can correct the
defect."
~.

2A Moore's Federal Practice, Sec. 15.10; Topping v.

147 F. 2d 715 (7th Cir. 1945) ("Litigation is not an art

in nice pleadings.

It can and should seldom be settled on its

merits at the pleading stage . . . . ")
When viewed according to the standards set forth
above,Sponsored
Appellants
respectfully submit that the Judgments
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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appealed from should be reversed on the following grounds:
A.

It is settled in Utah that a person who loans

money to a motor vehicle dealer is entitled to protection under
the Dealer's Bond.
B.

Whether a joint venture or debtor-creditor rela-

tionship existed in these actions is a question of fact to be
determined based upon all the facts and circumstances concernini
the relationship between the parties and not solely from the
terminology employed by Call Auto in its form agreements.
C.

Even if the language of the form agreements is

conclusive, as a matter of law, as to the existence of a joint
venture, it is clear that the provisions of the agreements do
not legally constitute a joint venture but rather create a
debtor-creditor relationship between the parties.
D.

In the event the Court feels the allegations of

the present Complaints are inadequate to state a cause of
action, substantial evidence exists in these cases that none of
the parties, including Call Auto, intended to enter into joint
ventures but rather intended and believed they had entered into
loan transactions and Appellants should be allowed to amend their
Complaints to more specifically allege that they entered into
loan transactions with Call Auto and not joint ventures.
A.

A PERSON LOANING MONEY TO A MOTOR VEHICLE DEAL~

IS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER THE DEALER'S BOND.
Pursuant to Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated (19SJ),
ithOU'.

no person can engage l.·n busi"ness as a motor vehicle dealer w

-6-
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first obtaining a bond in the penal sum of $20,000.00 to protect
the public.

Section 41-3-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953), specifies

the members of the public who are entitled to protection under
such bond.
"If any person shall suffer any loss or damage
by reason of fraud, fraudulent representation or
violation of any of the provisions of this act
by a licensed dealer or one of his salesmen . . .
such person shall have a right of action against such
dealer . . . and/or the sureties upon their respective
bonds." (Emphasis added)
This statute should be broadly construed to protect all persons
doing business with a motor vehicle dealer.
v. Redding,

626 P.2d

Western Surety Co.

437 (Ut. 1981).

There is really no dispute between the parties that,
as made clear by this Court in the case of Lawrence v. Ward,
300 P.2d 619 (Ut. 1956), a person loaning money to a motor
vehicle dealer is entitled to the protection of the Dealer's·
Bond in accordance with the broad language of Section 41-3-18.
In Lawrence, the bank which financed the Defendant
motor vehicle dealer's business recovered a Judgment against
the dealer's bonding company for the fraud of the dealer.

On

appeal, the bonding company argued that the financier of a
motor vehicle dealer's business was not within the class of
persons intended by the statute to be protected by the bond.
This Court rejected that contention and held that the financier
of the motor vehicle dealer's business was entitled to be protected by the bond, quoting from the case of Gotmnercial Standard
Insurance Company v. West, 249 P.2d 830, 832 as follows:

-7-
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"The statute in question encompasses and the
bond is given to cover the business of selling
used cars. That this is more than just the
actual sale or exchange of a used car is
apparent from the statute itself . . . . A person
who.engages in the used car business, as in any
business, must concern himself not alone with
selling but with all the myriad details required
to conduct such a business. That each part of
the business contributes to the total success
or failure is patent.
"'Also the statute itself is broader, we
believe, in allowing recovery against a
principal and his surety by persons injured
by the unlawful acts of the dealer than the
narrow construction contended for by Appellant.'"
See, also, Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Central
Finance Co., 237 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1951).
Thus, if Appellants should be able to establish at
trial that they were induced to loan money to Call Auto through
fraud and have suffered damages as a proximate result of such
fraud, then Plaintiffs are entitled to recover on Call Auto's
Dealer Bond issued by Respondent.
B.

WHETHER A JOINT VENTURE EXISTED BETWEEN THE

PARTIES IS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED AT THE TRIAL
BASED UPON ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND NOT MERELY FROM
THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENTS.
Although, as argued below, Appellants do not believe
that the language of the form agreement is such as to legally
constitute a joint venture, even if the agreement on its face
appeared to provide for a joint venture, the agreement would not
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be conclusive as to whether a joint venture in fact existed.
In order to establish a joint venture, it must be
demonstrated

that:
1.

The parties intended to establish a joint

2.

That they have an agreement to share the profits

venture;

and losses of the venture;
3.

That they have a proprietary interest in the

4.

That they have a right of mutual contol over

business; and

the subject matter of the venture.
For example, in Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Ut. 1974),
the Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an oral agreement pursuant to which Plaintiff agreed to purchase 100 head of cattle,
Defendant would care for the cattle, the offspring would be sold
by Plaintiff and the profits divided equally.

There was no

agreement as to the sharing of losses should any occur.

The

trial court held that the relationship between the parties was
that of joint venturers, ordered Defendant to account for certain
calves which he had in his possession and held the parties
would have to equally share the losses if any there were.

In

reversing the trial court's judgment and holding that no joint
venture existed, this Court stated:
"A joint venture is an agreement between tw'?
or more persons ordinarily but not necessarily
limited to a single transaction for the purpose
of making a profit. The require~ents for the
relationship are not exactly defined, but certain elements are essential: The parties must
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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combine their pr~perty, money, effects, skill,
labor and knowledge. As a general rule, there
must be a community of interest in the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual
right of control, a right to share in the profits
and unless there is an agreement to the con'
trary, a duty to share in any losses which may be
sustained.
"While the agreement to share losses need not
necessarily be stated in specific terms, the
agreement must be such as to permit the court
to infer that the parties intend to share
losses as well as profits." (Id. at 2)
Each of the prerequisites set forth above presents a
factual issue which cannot be answered on a Motion to Dismiss
simply because the written agreements prepared by Call Auto
used "joint venture" language, but rather must be determined
based upon all of the facts, circumstances and conduct of the
parties.
Thus, in Bender v. Bender. 397 P. 2d 957, 962 (Mont.
1965), the Court stated:
"To establish a joint venture or a partnership,
it is necessar to determine the intent of the
parties; such business re ations ips arise on y
when the parties intend to associate themselves
as such . . . . there must be a joint proprietary
interest and a right of mutual control over the
subject matter of the enterprise or over the
property engaged therein, and there must be an
agreement to share the profits . . . . the inten~ion of the arties has to be clearl manifested
. an must be ascertaine
rom a
t e acts
and circumstances and the actions and conduct of
the parties." (Emphasis added)
In Vineland Homes v. Barish, 292 P. 2d 941, 947 (Cal.
1956), the Court, quoting from Lusher v. Silver, 161 P.2d 472,
473, said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"In the last anal::rsis t~e fact of partnership
depends upon the intention of the parties. To
determine ~his intent not only the words of ·tfle
a reement itself, but the actions and conduct
o the parties may be consi ere .
Emp asis
added)
Likewise, in Porter v. Moore, 300 P.2d 513 (Mont. 1956)
the Court observed:
"The appellant Porter complains that the
District Court erred in determining that the
contract entered into between the parties did
not constitute a partnership. However, the
existence of a partnership depends upon th"e"
intention of the arties which must be ascerta1ne
rom a
the acts an circumstances
and the actions and conduct of the arties.
i e bot parties re erre to t e agreement as a partnership, in their pleadings and
in their testimony, and both purported to have
pleaded the alleged terms of the agreement
nevertheless the alle ation of ' artnershi '
is but a ega cone usion an neit er the
trial court nor the a ellate court will be
oun by nomenc ature to t e exc
substance." (Id at p. 517-518)
added)
~
And, in Simpson v. Bates, 239 P.2d 749 (Ut. 1952),
Defendant Simpson and Cross-Complainant Saunders were two licensed
used car dealers who did business from the same used car lot
and shared the rent, telephone, furnishings and buildings on
the car lot.

The sign on the premises read, "Used Cars" with

Saunders' name at one end and Simpson's at the other.

When one

of them sold a car belonging to the other, he was paid a fee
of $25.00.
In the transaction at issue there, Defendant Simpson
had sold a car to a customer but Cross-Claimant Saunders was
going to arrange the financing for the customer

so Saunders

filled out the contract with the customer showing himself as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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seller.

Defendant Simpson failed to deliver title to the car

to the customer and Cross-Claimant Saunders sought to recover
from Simpson's bonding company certain amounts he had been required to pay the finance company.

The bonding company argued

Saunders could not recover because he was a joint venturer with
Simpson on the sale of the car.

In rejecting this contention

and affirming the judgment against the bonding company on the
basis that Saunders and Simpson were not joint venturers

becau;:

they had no agreement to nor did they share profits, this Court
went behind the terms of the subject sales agreement showing
Saunders as the seller (which if true would have precluded recovery on Simpson's bond), and examined the real nature and
substance of the transaction which showed Saunders was not in
fact the seller.
The rationale of the District Court's decision seems
clear.

That is, if Appellants were joint venturers or partners

with Call Auto such that they had a right to or did in fact
participate in the operation of Call Auto's business, Appellant:
were, in effect, co-owners of the business which obtained the
bond for the protection of the public and should not be entitlei
to the protection of that bond.

Assuming this reasoning is

correct, the existence of a joint venture between the parties
should be determined based upon what the parties intended and

-12-
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c

what really happened,

not by artificially limiting the inquiry

to a few words from the form agreement.

Based upon the foregoing

authorities, it seems clear that neither the Court nor the parties
are bound by the nomenclature used by Call Auto in its form
agreement and that a factual issue is presented which must be
resolved at trial.

C.

EVEN IF THE LANGUAGE OF THE FORM AGREEMENT WERE

Ii:

BINDING, THAT LANGUAGE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO LEGALLY CONSTITUTE
A JOINT VENTURE.
As previously stated, the form agreements which were
prepared by Call Auto recited that Appellants were paying money
to Call Auto "as a type of joint venture" (whatever that is),
that Call Auto was going to use that money to purchase and sell
property at a profit "in its business" and that Call Auto guaranteed to pay Appellants a guaranteed "profit" in specified installments regardless of whether Call Auto made any profit
in its business or the amount of such profits.

Furthermore,

the monies paid by Appellants were required to be fully secured
by Call Auto at all times.

And, in some of the transactions,

Call Auto even executed promissory notes in favor of Appellants.
The provisions of the form agreements on their face are not
sufficient to constitute a joint venture under the standards
set forth above.
First, it is clear under the agreements that the
business is solely Call Auto's business and that Appellants are
given no proprietary interest therein whatsoever and no right
of control
over the subject matter of the enterprise.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Second, although the agreements speak in terms of
paying Appellants a share of the profits, there is no question
but that the agreements in reality simply guarantee that
Appellants will be paid a set amount regardless of the profits
or losses realized by Call Auto in its business.

To secure the:;

debts, the agreements purported to grant security

interests~

Call Auto's assets to Appellants.

The Court faced a similar

situation in Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 194 P.2d 992 (Ore.
1948).

In that case, the Plaintiff had invented a lift truck

and the parties entered into an agreement pursuant to which
Defendant was to produce the lift truck.

Plaintiff set up

dealerships throughout the country and was to receive eight per·
cent of gross sales.

The Court held that the agreement did not

constitute a joint venture, saying:
"He (Mamon) was not at that time, under any
definition of joint adventure that we have seen
or within the holding of any case to which we
have been referred, a joint adventurer with
Vaughan, because he did not share in the profits
of the business as such, but under his agreement
was entitled to his com ensation of ei ht ercent w ether there were pro its or not.
Emphasis
added)
Moreover, even if the agreements in the present case
gave Appellants a share of the profits of Call Auto, that fact
would not be conclusive as to the existence of a joint ventun
if it is shown that Appellants were being paid those profits
in repayment of a loan and not because they were co-owners of
the business.

Thus, Utah Code Annotated, Section 48-1-4(4),

provides as follows:
-14-
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"The receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business is prima facia evidence
that he is a partner in the business but no
such inference shall be drawn if such profits
were received in payment:
''(a)

As a debt by installments or otherwise.

"(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts
of payment vary with the profits of the business."
To the same effect, see Hayes v. Killinger, 385 P.2d
747 (Ore. 1963); True v. High Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc.,
577 P.2d 991 (Wy. 1974); Nelson v. Abraham, 177 P.2d 931 (Cal.
1947).
Finally, there is no agreement whatsoever as to sharing
the losses of Call Auto and the circumstances are not such as
to permit the Court to infer such an agreement in view of the
fact that many of the Appellants have been repaid certain amounts
notwithstanding the fact that Call Auto suffered very substantial
losses.

Such an agreement is essential to the existence of a

joint venture.
D.

Bas-sett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Ut. 1974).
IF THE PRESENT COMPLAINTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO

STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, LEAVE TO A.1'1END THE COMPLAINTS SHOULD BE
GRANTED AS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN ADDUCED IN THESE ACTIONS
THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES INTENDED TO ENTER INTO JOINT VENTURES
BUT, RATHER, INTENDED TO ENTER INTO LOAN TRANSACTIONS,
Appellants respectfully submit that the present Complaints
are sufficient to state a cause of action against Respondent and
that the District Court's Orders dismissing the Complaints should
be reversed.

However, should this Court believe that the Com-

plaints are not sufficient to state a cause of action, it is
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submitted that the trial court's Orders should be reversed at
least to the extent of allowing Appellants leave to amend the
Complaints to more specifically allege that no joint ventures wer,
intended to be entered into, nor were they entered into, and that
the transactions between the parties constituted loan transaction;
Such a ruling is clearly in the interest of justice as
substantial evidence exists already in this action that the part!;
did not intend to enter into joint ventures nor did they believe
that such relationships had been entered into.

For example,

Call Auto alleges in its Answers in these actions that the trans·
actions with Plaintiffs were loan transactions (B.R.74; L.R.12).
Also, the Affidavit of Call Auto's President, Elroy T. Barlow
(B.R.65-66) shows very clearly that Call Auto intended to and
believed it had entered into secured loan transactions with
Plaintiffs, not joint ventures.

Thus, Mr. Barlow states in part

"Affiant represents . . . that as early as
February 7, 1979 (six months before Appellants
first paid any money to Call Auto) pursuant
to a Board of Directors Meeting attended by
Mr. Campbell, there it was unanimously decided
Call Auto should continue receivin loan
proceeds rom individual parties.
(Emphasis added)
Mr. Barlow further states in his Affidavit that:
"At a Board of Direcotrs Meeting held on
October 15, 1979, . . . loans by individual
creditors were discussed and it was unanimously agreed that an effort should be made to
reduce the amount of interest previously approved
on such loans . . .
"Affiant further represents that at all times
during the operational period of Call Auto,
he has discussed and acted in concert with
L. A. Campbell in making business decis~o~s for
the corporation to include though not ~im~t~d
to the authority to obtain loans from individual
lenders together with the interest and terms
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In addition, Call Auto has produced minutes of Board Meetings
during 1979, both before and after Appellants initially paid
money to Call Auto, showing very clearly that Call Auto viewed
the transactions as loans (B.R.115&119).

The Affidavit of L. A.

Campbell, a principal shareholder and officer of Call Auto,
also shows that Call Auto believed it had borrowed the money
from Appellants (B.R.62).
Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that under
these circumstances it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny leave to amend the Complaints where very
clearly any

possib~e

defects in the Complaints could be

corrected.
CONCLUSWN

It is respectfully submitted that the District Court
erred in dismissing the Complaints with prejudice and without
leave to amend and that the Judgments should be reversed by
this Court.

Appellants should not be precluded from recovering

on the Dealer's Bond issued by Respondent in favor of Call Auto
simply because the form agreements prepared by Call Auto use the
term "as a type of joint venture".

Rather, the true nature of the

relationship between the parties should be determined based
upon all the facts and circumstances at trial.

Appellants should

be given the opportunity to prove at trial that they had no
right to, nor did they, participate in or control the operation
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of Call Auto's business and that they simply made what they beli,
were secured loans to Call Auto.
DATED this

.227~day

of

~

, 1981.

Respec:fUl}: submitted,

BURBIDGE, MABEY & MITCHELL
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APPENDIX A

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AGREEMENT

P. 6 4

THIS AGREEMENT• entered into this

day or

.

ajmf . ,.m.., ~• -·-=~
~

herein referred to as FIRST PARTY• and

_

_

herein referred to as SECOND PARTY:

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS. SECOND PARTY has an established business in the buying and

selling of all types or personal property and equipment. and:
WHEREAS• SECOND PARTY has approached FIRST PARTY for the purpose of

entering into an investment in their business as a type of joint venture,
and;

WHEREAS. each of the parties have obtained independent legal counsel
and are fully aware of this business transaction;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises of the parties and

as further set forth herin. the undersigned parties hereby agree as follows:
IRST P~ herevit~P.
s over to SECOND PARTY the sum of

~ ~"/~
~-

(/ ,

--/../!~/'/~~ ($

.......a.......;:;.o.c.,;;,ti"""1:2"""0
.....,'-<29-----

cash to

be used by SECOND PARTY in buying and selling various types of personal
property and equipment at a profit in its business.
2.

SECOND PARTY agrees and guarantees to pay over to the FIRST PARTY, as

his or her share of the profits and investment, the following sums of money
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,

chase price of - - - - -

This agreement

es, Inc. clear title to the
y and/or all liens and

encumbrances.

Auto and Equipment Sales• Inc.

the right t
3.

It is further understood that the am:>unt of investment to be

returned to F:IBST PARTY will also be shown by and secured by various
personal property and equipment in the business• but it is t'urther
understood that SECOND PARTY s::,,.w.i be able to deal at a profit with
that property and equipnent if they deem it expedient and proper.
4.

It is further understood and agreed that the parties hereto

t./~
period
t7
or longer• if the parties may determine• under the same terms and

may continue the investment for an additional

ftt!-

conditions and repayment of profits to FmST PARTY as set forth in
paragraph 2 herein.
INWITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned parties have executed this
agreement the day and year first above written.
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